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IN THE SUPREME COURT

of the

STATE OF UTAH

EDYTH H. WESTERFIELD,
Plaintiff and Respondent,

vs.

WILMER T. COOP,
Defendant and Appellant.

YOUNG, THATCHER & GLASMANN
Attorneys for Respondent

PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
In this brief we refer to the parties as they appeared in the court below. The record on appeal is in
two volumes, one of which consists of the pleadings,
minute entries, and similar papers. All references to
this volume are designated by the letter "R." The
other volume which is separately numbered is a transcript of the testimony and proceedings at the trial.
References to this volume are designated by th e letter
1

"T".
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ADDITIONAL STATEMENT OF FACTS
Respondent feels that some additional facts to those
contained in appellant's brief should be brought to the
court's attention for a· full understanding of the factual situation involved in this case.
Defendant's pleadings in this case as contained
in his answer amounted to some admissions and a general
denial as to certain allegations contained in plaintiff's
complaint. The defendant fail'ed, in his pleadings, to
plead affirmatively or allege in any manner the statutes
or laws of Utah or California. See defendants answer
as contained in R. The only place in the R. or T. that
def'endant relied upon an affirmative defense to plaintiff's cause of action as set forth in plaintiffs complaint was, at the time of trial, when defendant moved
the court for permission to amend his answer so that
the same might contain the affirmative defense of Statute of Limitations. Plaintiff, at that time, requested
the court to require the defendant to state his amendment with particularity. The court so advised defendant and defendant thereafter stated into the record the
amendment to his answer in the following words: "Paragraph 8. As a further defens'e, the defendant alleges
that the Statute of Limitations has run on all amounts
claimed to be due prior to April1947." See T. 36.
The defendant also failed to plead, allege or prove
at any time or place in the trial court below, as a defense or otherwise, the statutes or laws of the States
of California or Utah. SeeR. and T. generally.
The plaintiff attempted many times, by personal
pl'ea and court action, over the period of years that the
2
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support money was accruing, for which plaintiff was
given judgment against defendant and from which judgment this appeal stems, to obtain payment from the
defendant of the support payments which he had been
ordered to pay by tlre California court. See T. 12, 21, 22.
The defendant was generally employed during the
period of time for which the lower court awarded judment for support moneys, to-wit, 1947 to 1952, the
majority of said period of time bei~g employed by the
Southern Pacific Railroad Company. See T. 24, 25.
During all of the years that defendant was supposed
to be paying support moneys to plaintiff under the
order of the California court, to-wit, from the year 1942
to and including the year 1952, the defendant paid to
plaintiff the total of only $490.00, and of which, $465.00
was paid as Army allotments through the Army and
only $25.00 was paid by defendant personally. See
paragraph 3 of Findings of Fact as contained in the R.
ARGUMENT
POINT 1, APPELLANTS DESIGNATION OF
POINTS: Appellant has based all of his argument under
the one designation i.e. Tire court errored in failing
to dismiss the complaint for the reason that said complaint failed to state a cause for action upon which relief
could be granted. We will adopt the same method in
this answering brief.
Tire facts as related above and in plaintiff's brief
disclose a judgment awarded in California in favor of
plaintiff and against defendant for the support of plain3
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tiff and three minor children of the parties, and for the
purpose nf this appeal the award was for monthly in~
stallments of $100.00 per month. Plaintiff, in her complaint, alleg'ed the judgment and the amount due and
unpaid thereunder. Defendant, in his pleadings, admitted the judgment but denied the amount due and in
a subsequent amendment to the pleadings at the .time
of trial defendant asserted generally the Statute of
Limitations as an affirmative defense as a bar to any
recovery for any sum due prior to April of 1947. The
lower court, in its Findings and Judgment, awarded
plaintiff judgment against the defendant only foT support moneys accruing from April, 1947. It is obvious
therefore, that the lower court followed defeDdan-ts request to assert the bar of the Statute of Limitations as
to all support payments accruing prior to April, 1947.
This is so even though defendant, in his amended pleading, failed to assert the specific statute of limitations
upon which he relied as required by our law, At any
rate, the defendant did not, at any time in the court
below, assert the Statute of Limitations of any state,
either in general terms or specifically as a bar to the
recovery of support ·payments w·hich accrued from
April, 1947 and for which plaintiff was granted judgment by the trial court.
It is well settled that the defense of Statute of
Limitations' is a procedural 1natter and governed ·by
the law of the forum. The law of the forum, Utah in
this case, is contained in Utah Rules of Civil Procedure,
Rule 9(h), to-wit: '"In pleading the Statute of Limitations it is not necessary to state the facts showing the
defense but it may be alleged generally that the ca-use
·4
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of action is barred by the prov~swns of the statute
relied on, referring to or describing such statute specifically and definitely by section number, sub-section
designation, if any, or otherwise designating the provision reli.ed upon sufficiently clear to identify it (Italics ours).
As to the remaining question pres'ented by defendant on appeal, to-wit, that of enforcement of a foreign
judgment, the plaintiff would like to state that the
general law on this subject matter is set forth in 41
ALR 1419, 57 ALR 1113, 94 ALR 331. A summation of
the law on this point is briefly set forth at pages 1419
and 1420 of tlre afore-described 41 ALR as follows:
"The United States Supreme Court and the various
other courts whose decisions are cited below have held:
(a) That a decree for future alimony is within the protecion of the full faith and credit laws of the Federal
Constitution, (Barber v. Barber), 21 HOW (U.S.) 582,
16 L. ed. 226; (b) Except so far as its enforcement
is subject to the discretion of the court which rendered
it (Lynde v. Lynde), 181 U.S. 183, 45 L. ed. 810; (c)
And therefore, that it may be enforced as to past due
installments where the power of the court rendering it
to modify it if exerted can only operate prospectively
(Sistare v. Sistare), 218 U.S. 1, 54 L. led. 905."
The Utah case of Roundy v. Roundy, 202 P. 211 is
cited under the afore-described paragraph (c) as being
in accord with the holding that past due installments
are entitled to full faith and credit treatm~ent.
The law on the matter is also cited at Page 1113
of the afore-described 57 ALR. "The rule is that a

5
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judgment for alimony payable in installments rendered
upon entering a decree for divorce constitutes a final
judgment within the full faith and credit clause of the
Federal Constitution so far as accrued installments are
concerned, no modification of the decree having been
made prior thereto, unless it appear from the law of
the jurisdiction wherein the decree was granted that
the power of modification expressly retained extends
to accrued as well as to future installments of alimony."
The present ruling authority on the question of
full faith and credit and its application to alimony and
support judgments is the case of Sistare v. Sistare,
supra. This cas~e came along after the well known
United States Supreme Court cases of Barber v. Barber
and Lynde v. Lynde, supra, and commented upon those
earlier cases in its decision as follows:
"And answering the question not only by the light
of reason but by the authoritive force of the ruling of
the Barber case which had prevailed for so many years
and by th'e reason expressed in the Lynde case, we think
that the conclusion is inevitable that the Lynde case
cannot be held to have over-ruled the Barber case, and
th'erefore, that the two cases must be interpreted in
harmony, one with the other, and that on so doing it
results:

"First, that, generally speaking where a decree is
rendered for alimony and is made payable in future
installments, the right to such installments becomes
absolute and vested upon becoming due and is therefore protected by the full faith and credit clause, provided no modification of the decree has been rnade prior
6
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to the maturity of the installments, since, as decreed in
the Barber case, 'alimony declared to a wife in a divorce-is as much a debt of record, until the decree has
been recalled, as any other judgment for money is.'
"Second, that this general rule, however, does not
obtain whereby the law of the state in which a judgment
for future alimony is rendered the right to demand and
receive such future alimony is discretionary with the
court which rendered the decree, to such an extent that
no absolute or vested right attaches to receive the installments ordered by the decree to be paid, even although no application to annul or modify the decree in
respect to alimony has been made prior to the installments becoming due." (Italics ours).
The court in the Sistare case further stated, in
commenting whether there was retained in the statute
of the state the power to am'end alimony installments
already accrued, as follows: "But it is equally certain
that nothing in this language expressly gives power to
revoke or modify an installment of alimony which had
accrued prior to the making of an application to vary
or modify, and every reasonable implication must be
resorted to against the existence of such power in the
absence of clear language manifesting an intention to
confer it."
In addition to relying upon the Lynde cas~e, which
has been modified by the decision in the Sistare case,
or at least the interpretation given of the Lynde case
by tire defendant, has been modified by the Sistare case
interpretation of the Lynde case, the defendant relies
upon the Utah case of Hunt v. Monroe, 91 P. 269 and

7
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states that said case is the only Utah case on this point.
Plaintiff submits that there are other later Utah cases on
the particular point and that in the Utah case of Roundy
v. Roundy supra, the court held as to support payments
owing by a father to a mother for the support of minor
children that "the obligation however, follows the father
wherever he may go and in view of the decision in
Sistare v. Sistare the past due installments of alimony
may be in forced in the State of Idaho under the full
faith and credit laws of the Federal Constitution."
(Italics ours).
In the Utah case of Myers v. Myers, 218 P. 123, our
court comments on the earlier case of Hunt v. J.I;Jonroe
which is relied upon by defendant and announced that
in the Hunt v. Monroe case "the court there followed the
Supreme Court of the United States in Lynde v. Lynde.
In that case the court indulged the presumption that
the laws of Colorado were the same as the laws of
Utah in the absence of any proof as to what the laws
of that state were." (Italics ours). It is also pointed
out in Myers v. Myers, "that the effect of the opinion in
the Lynde case was to modify the Barber case-the
opinion of this court in Hunt v. Monroe was announced
in 1907. Subsequent to that time in 1910, the Supreme
Court of the United States in an elaborate opinion
(Sistare v. Sistare) adhered to the ruling in Barber v.
Barber and differentiated the Lynde and Barber cases,
and in effect holds that the two cases considered together are not necessarily in conflict, 'and in any event,
if there be, that Lynde v. Lynde mHst be restricted or
qualified so as to cause it not to over-rule the decision
in the Barber case." (Italics ours). The Utah court,

8
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in the case of Myers v. Myers, then went on to set forth
the ruling of the Sistare case as set out supra, and in
interpreting the Utah law on the subject matter, adopted
the exact language of its holding as the law of Utah
as follows : "But it is equally certain that nothing in
this language expressly gives power to revoke or modify
an installment of alimony which had accrued prior to
the making of the application to vary or modify, and
every reasonable implication must be resorted to a-:
gainst the existance of such power in the absence of
clear language manifesting an intention to confer it."
(Italics ours).
Plaintiff is fully aware however, that the Myers V·.
Myers case was subsequently over-ruled by the Utah
case of Austad v. Austad, 269 P. 2d 284, only however,
insofar as it was in conflict on the question of whether
alimony installments automatically terminated upon the
remarriage of the wife. The Austad case of course
holds that alimony installments automatically terminate
upon the remarriage of the wif'e. The Austad case however, is not authority in this regard as to support payments for minor children nor as to application of the
full faith and credit provision of the Federal Constitution.
It would appear then from the foregoing that Utah
adopts the law as set forth in tlre Sistare case, supra,
to-wit, the enforcement of foreign judgments for alimony and support money as to accrued installments
and that the Utah law as to accrued support payments
for minor children· is a final judgment and enforceable
under tlre full faith and credit provision of the Federal
9
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Constitution and that accrued alimony payments due
up to the time of the remarriage of the wife have the
effect of being a final judgment for money and likewise
'enforceable under the full faith and credit clause.
Some of the cases cited by defendant in his brief
are cases in which the California courts have enforced
foreign judgments and then commented upon the law
as it might apply to California, the latter being dictum
only.
Plaintiff will now set forth for the court's consideration decisions from other jurisdictions wherein the
courts considered problems similar to the ones here at
issue and granted full faith and credit enforcement of
California decrees for alimony and support installments
already accrued as being final judgments.
See the
following:

In the case of Caples v. Caples, 47 F. 2d 225, 284
US 630, in an action in a Federal Court sitting in
Texas, to recover installments of alimony (for the support of the wife and a minor child) accrued under a
decree of divorce of a California court, held that the
decree of the California court is entitled to full faith
and credit as a fixed judgment where, although it appears that under the California Code the Court awarding
alimony may from time to time modify its order in
that respect, it does not appear that the California court
may modify the decree as to alimony that has accrued,
but on the contrary it appears that it cannot do so.
Also see the Oregon case of Cousineau v. Cousineau,
63 P. 2d 897. In this case, involving an action by the

10
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wife to collect arrears of past due alimony under a
California decree of divorce, the defense being that the
California decree was not a final decree and not entitled to full faith and credit, the court presumed that
the California law as to power of the court to modify
the decree as to past due installments of alimony was
the same as the law of Oregon, under which the court
had no power to modify the decree retroactively as to
accrued installments, and held that as to such instaUments the suit in Oregon was predicated upon a foreign
final judgment within the full faith and credit clause.
For a similar holding see the Washington case of
Shibley v. Shibley, 42 P. 2d 446.
Also see the Colorado case of McGregor v. McGregor, 122 P. 390, where the Colorado court lreld that
a California decree for past due installments for alimony
was entitled to enforcement in the State of Colorado
as being within the full faith and credit clause of th'e
Federal Constitution.
See also the California cases of Steele v. Steele, 239
P. 2d 63, and Keck v. Keck, 26 P. 2d 300, where th'e
courts of California held that accrued unpaid installments for alimony and support money are final judgments and cannot be modified.
The defendant failed to plead or offer in evidence
the statutes and laws of the State of California in any
manner whatsoever in the trial court below, and· defendant cannot now, upon appeal to the Supreme Court
of Utah, start relying upon the statutes and laws of the
State of California for the reason that the law of the
majority of the jurisdictions in the United States, in11
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eluding the State of Utah, is that in order for a party
to a law suit to rely upon the statutes or laws of a
foreign or sister state, he must specifically plead the
statute or law relied upon and thereafter prove the
same by offering competent evidence thereof in the
trial court. S'ee 41 Am. Jur. 296. "Where it is not otherwise provided by statute, the courts do not take judicial
knowledge of the laws of foreign states, and where
such statutes are material to the controversy and are
relied on as a basis of a right of action or as a defense,
they must be set forth by the pleader so that the court
may judge of their effect. The rule applies as well to
the statute of a foreign country and those of a sister
state, neither of which is provable if not pleaded. The
rule extends as to a settled construction by a court of
last resort of a state enacting a statute which is relied
upon to control the judgment of a court of another
state. In the absence of a statute to the contrary, it is
the general rule that if a settled construction by a
court of last resort placed upon its own statutes is
relied upon to control the judgment of a court of
another state in interpreting such statues that settled
construction must be pleaded and prored. The basis
of this general rule is that the courts cannot take judicial knowledge of the laws or decisions of the courts
of other states, and they will not go beyond the averments of the pleading except as they rnay be aided by
the presumption that the law is the sante as that of the
forum." (Italics ours).
Also see 20 An1. Jur. 182. "Courts of one state do
not, as a general rule, take judicial notice of the laws
of another state or country. Ordinarily when a litigant

12
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

relies upon such foreign laws as the basis of his claim
or defense h'e must plead and prove such laws. How~
ever, with regard to the laws of a sister state the broad
rule prevails that in an absence of a showing to the
contrary such laws will be presumed to be the same as
the laws of the forum. - A more accurate statement
of the rule is to the effect that the court presumes, in
the absence of evidence to the contrary, that the common
law of a sister state is the same as its own. The burden
of proving the law of another state rests upon the party
who claims rights under it and in the absence of such
proof th'e trial court is authorized to presume that the
same rule of law that obtains there prevails in the
other state. Thus, in accordance with this rule it will
be presumed that the law of a sister state as to which
there is no proof is the same as that of the forum in
respect of public policy." (Italics ours) The last cited
Am. Jur. authority cites the Utah case of Dickson v.
Mullings, et al 241 P. 840 as being in accord therewith.
The Utah court there held : "No statute of N'ew York
is either pleaded or proved. It of course is well settled
that state courts cannot take judicial notice of laws or
statutes of a sister state. It also is well settled in this
jurisdiction that, in the absence of proof, it will be presumed that the law of another state is the same as the
law of the forum-." (Italics ours).
In the Utah case of Shurtleff v. Oregon Shortline
Railroad Company, 241 P. 1058, in which the law of
Idaho was pleaded but no evidence or proof of the law
placed in the record, our court held: "In absence of
proof, it will be presumed that law of another state is
the same of that of forum, and presumption is ex-

13
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tended to statutory as well as common law."
ours).

(Italics

In the Utah case of Todaro v. Gardner, 285 P. 2d
839, the court held: "The Arizona law was not pleaded
below and hence this court follows the legal presumption
that in the absence of evidence to the contrary the
Statute of another state on a particular subject is
deemed to be the same as the statute of this state."
(Italics ours). Also see Buhler v. Maddison, 140 P.
2d 933, a Utah case of a similar holding.
1

Also S ee the following Utah cases for similar holdings but of more recent vintage: Whitmore Oxygen Company v. Utah State Tax Commission, 196 P. 2d 976.
United Airlines Transport Corporation et al v. Industrial Commission et al, 151 P. 2d 591. In the last Utah
case cited supra on commenting upon the laws of our
sister state of California, our Supreme Court h'eld:
"Where laws of a foreign state are not offered in evidence, Supreme Court must conclude that laws of such
state are the same as those of the forurn." (Italics ours).
1

On the question of whether a court may, in its
administration of equity and justice, apportion lump
sum support installments after the final decree of
divorce has been entered when the wife remarries and
minor children from time to time attain their majority
as occurred in th~e case now at issue, the plaintiff contends that the trial court of the forum may do so as
long as the apportionn1ent follows the dictates of justice
and equitable principles. There does not appear to be
a great deal of authority on this particular point. Plaintiff however, desires to cite for the court's consideration

14
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the following: Wilkins v. Wilkins, 224 P. 2d 371. This is
a California case where a wife had been awarded a lump
sum per month for joint support of herself and minor
children and the court held that: "After minor children
attained their majority wife was not in equity and good
conscience entitled to receive full amount of monthly
support nor to require husband to continue paying for
support of children after their majority. Trial court
in exercise of its discretion in issuing a Writ of Execution of a divorce decree requiring husband to make
monthly payments for support of wife and minor children, had duty to determine extent of husband's legal
and equitable liability to pay under judgment."
The court in the Wilkins case above, cited the case
of Probst v. Probst, 21 N.Y.S. 2d 294, wherein the court
held: "That a l'ltmp sum ordered in support of the wife
and son might be divided and an allocation of it made
for each if the basis of the allocation was reasonable."
(Italics ours).
In the case of Frost v. Frost 21 N.Y.S. 2d 438,
alimony allowed in a lump sum was reduced as of the
date the younger child attained her majority and in the
case of Gerrein's Adm'r v. Michie, 91 S. W. 252, the
Kentucky court held: "That such deductions were proper
when the chancellor was called upon to enforce the
judgment."
Again on this point in a most recent California
case of Anderson v. Anderson, 276 P. 2d 862, th e California court held: "That where divorce decree provided
for alimony and support of two children without segregation as to amount, and older child reached his
1

15
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majority, Superior Court properly refused to consider
the divorce decree void and properly proceeded to determine whether execution should issue for accru ed
installments, and, if so, for what amount, and whether
decree should be modified prospectively." The California court held further: "Tire position of the California courts as to unsegregated decrees for support of
wife and children after majority of any of the latter is
well settled. In Wilkins v. Wilkins, 213 P. 2d 748, there
appears an excellent review of cases on the subject.
The rule is that the court may modify the prior decree
prospectively but may not make a modification operative
on payments already accrued but execution on the later
payments may not issue as a matter of right. The court
has the discretion of determining under the equities of
the situation whetlrer execution should issue for all or
any portion of the accrued amounts."
1

In accordance with plaintiff's position supra, the
plaintiff does not contend that the law afore cited as
the law of the State of California is binding upon the
Utah Supreme Court, but on the contrary states again
that inasmuch as th e law of California was not pleaded
nor proved in the trial court below it cannot be relied
upon in the Supreme Court, and that judicial notice of
the law of the State of California should not be taken but
that under the law of the State of Utah as set forth supra,
the court in the absence of pl'eading or proof of the law
of a foreign or sister state will presume the foreign law
to be the same as the law of the forun1. The plaintiff
merely cites the line of cases n~ext above cited for the
purpose of showing the court that apportionment of lump
sum installments awards is often done by trial courts
1
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and arprproved by appellate courts.

The trial court in the case now at issue used its
good discretion in applying 'equity and reason in working with all the facts as proved by evidence that were
before it and apportioned the lump .sum Cali£ornia
judgment of $100.00 per month at the rate of $25.00 per
plaintiff and $25.00 per each minor child .and allowed
plaintiff nothing for alimony .by reason of the fact
that she had remarried but did allow in its judgment
$25.00 per month for each of the minor children of the
parHes from April, 1947 to the date when they attained
their individual majority. Such a judgment is, witbout
question, bas'ed upon equitable principles 'and good
reason.
Plaintiff has set _forth herein her reasons why
defendant's attack on the ,judgment rendered by the
lower court should fail. However, in the -event the
Supreme Court feels that the California judgment involved herein is not required to be inforced under .the
.full faith and credit provisions of the Federal Constitutioo there is still anothe.r argume.n.t as to w-hy .t.he California judgment should be enforced and t.hat is wpon
the principles of comity. See in this regard 132 A.L.R.
1272, which is an annotation of the cases which have
expressly considered the question whether a foreign de·cree of alimony not within the full faith and credit provision may nevertheless be recognized and enfor.ced in the
forum under the principles of :comity and attention is
called to the fact that many of the cases which have been
-denied full faith and cr.edit enforcement .of the decree and
refus'ed to enforce it locally have done .so withol!lt
1
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further considering the question whether it could be
properly enforced under principles of comity. This
particular ALR has the following statement to make
concerning this problem: "Since the holding that there
was no constitutional obligation to enforce does not lead
to the conclusion that there was no obligation not to
enforce, these cases are at most neutral on the question
under consideration." (Italics ours). The ALR cites
that the cases which have considered the question of
comity are few and those are in conflict. However, the
ALR, commencing on page 1275, cites the jurisdictions
which have adopted the principles of comity and among
them is the State of California. The California case
being that of Biewend v. Biewend, 109 P. 2d 701, and
court in this case holds: "That a :Missouri decree as
to future installments of alimony although not enititled
to enforcement in California under the full faith and
credit provision of the Federal Constit1dion because it
was subject to modification as to such installments by
the court of Missouri on the ground of the divorced)
wife's subsequent remarriage - or the arriving at majority of the children of the marriage, 1cas entitled to
enforcement under the rules of com,ity by th'e rendition
of a California decree therein, good until the ~Iissouri
court had in fact modified its decree upon th e application of the husband to that court, although the rule of
comity permitting the enforcen1ent of any foreign decrees for future instalhnents of ali1nony is subject to
the qualification that the enforcement thereof in California would not controvene the public policy of California." (Italics ours).
1
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CONCLUSION
The plaintiff would like to reiterate by way of conclusion that she takes the position that in the first place,
defendant cannot raise upon appeal tire matters he is
attempting to raise when he did not plead or prove the
statutes or laws of California in the lower court, and
that it will therefore be presumed that tire law of California is the same as the law of the forum and that
under the law of the forum a judgment for support
money for children is final and entitled to enforcem'ent
under the full faith and credit provision of the Federal
Constitution, and that even if the court finds that the
particular decree involved herein is not entitled to enforcement under the full faith and credit clause it may
nevertheless be enforced under the equitabte principles
of comity, and that the lower court's judgment rendered
herein is based upon justice and good r'eason. In fact,
it would be shocking if the defendant herein did not
have to pay anything, and could therefore continue to
dodge his responsibility to his family as he has done
so successfully in the past. The judgment of the court
below should be affirmed for the reasons stated herein.
Respectfully submitted,

YOUNG, THATCHER & GLASMANN,
.~

At~~orneys for Respondent
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